I. Introduction
Five years after United States v. Booker (543 U.S. 220, 2005) rendered the federal sentencing guidelines "effectively advisory," concern is growing among some commentators about a surge in inter-judge sentencing disparity in the federal system.' At its regional hearings in 2009 , the United States Sentencing Commission has received anecdotal reports, especially from prosecutors, of increasingly sharp differences between judges.2 Attorney General Eric Holder has called for an assessment of whether post-Booker sentencing practices "show an increase in unwarranted sentencing disparities" based on "differences in judicial philosophy among judges working in the same courthouse."3 Not all forms of disparity in sentencing are a cause for concern, 4 but inter-judge disparity is widely recognized as unwarranted. A central purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to reduce disparity driven by individual judges' philosophies, preferences, and biases. Congress was convinced that similarly situated offenders were receiving widely variable sentences depending on which judge happened to be assigned to the case. 5 Mandatory sentencing guidelines, applicable to all judges and all offenders, were supposed to address that problem. Strong evidence supports the conclusion that the federal guidelines, despite their well-documented shortcomings, succeeded in reducing judge-to-judge sentencing disparity. judges, the study was limited to cases from the Boston division, where more than a dozen judges draw from a common case pool using a random case-distribution 
III. A First Look at Post-Booker Guideline Sentencing
The preliminary evidence from Boston reinforces what has been reported anecdotally in district courts throughout the country: Sharp and growing differences are apparent in guideline sentencing patterns between judges in the same courthouse. With some judges sentencing below the guideline range far more frequently than their colleagues, a defendant's odds of receiving a downward departure or variance increasingly depend on which judge happens to draw the case.
Figure r shows the distribution of average rates of below-guideline sentencing among Boston judges, arranged by time period. Each dot represents the average for a single judge during that period.
After a contraction under the PROTECT Act, the distribution in rates of below-range sentencing widened beyond pre-Booker levels and has continued to grow. Since Booker, some judges in Boston continue to sentence below the guideline range as low as io% of the time, whereas others are sentencing below the guideline range more than 40% or even 5o% of the time. One senior judge sentenced below the guideline range a remarkable 71% of the time during the eighteen months after Booker, more than six times the rate of one of his colleagues.
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The data from Boston also allow a first look at how individualjudges' sentencing patterns under the Guidelines have changed since Booker. Figure 2 shows changes in the average rate of below-range sentencing for all Boston judges combined.
The average stood at 18.4% under the mandatory guidelines, fell to 13.3% under the PROTECT Act, and jumped to about 30% in all three periods after Booker. But aggregated figures such as these, like the Commission's Sentences by Judge A roughly fit the average guideline sentencing pattern for all Boston judges, with a noticeable decline in below-range sentences under the PROTECT Act, followed by an even larger increase after Booker. By contrast, each of the other judges' sentencing patterns fits a distinctive shape, typical of others in the data set:
Sentences by Judge B fit a "free at last"' 6 pattern: a low rate of below-range sentencing in the two preBooker periods (ii.i% and 10.5%) and a much higher rate in the three post-Booker periods (40.0%,
37.5%, and 52.8%). Judge B's rate of below-range sentencing more than quadrupled after Booker.
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Sentences by Judge C fit a "business as usual" pattern, with very little change between periods. Judge C's rate of below-range sentencing moved less than one-half of one percent between the PROTECT Act and the first 18 months after Booker, from 10.5% to lo.o%, and also remained relatively stable in the Mandatory Guidelines (13.3%), Post-Booker II (I9.I%), and Kimbrough/Gall (16.1%) periods. 8 Sentences by Judge D fit a "return to form" pattern, in which Booker effectively nullified the effects of the PROTECT Act. Judge D's rate of below-range sentencing stood at 32.7% in the Mandatory Guidelines period, but plummeted to 5.6% under the PROTECT Act. After slowly increasing to 17.0% in the eighteen months after Booker, Judge D's rate returned to 38.6% and 34.6% in the two most recent periods.
The sharp differences between the "free at last," "business as usual," and "return to form" patterns in Boston suggest fundamental disagreements between judges about the guidelines. Plus, they tend to confirm reports from prosecutors that inter-judge disparity in guideline sentencing has become more acute since Booker.
IV. Implications
What explains the growing split between judges in guideline sentencing? The raw data do not provide answers, but two explanations seem plausible. First, now that the Guidelines are advisory, some judges may actually agree with the recommended guideline sentence more often than their colleagues. Although many judges have criticized the Guidelines for their severity, surveys of district court judges have long reported sharp divisions, with a substantial contingent responding that the Guidelines effectively achieve the purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).' 9 Booker has allowed those differences of opinion to drive sentencing outcomes more frequently. Second, some judges may be persuaded to impose within-guideline sentences for institutional reasons: deference to the Commission as an expert body, a belief that the Guidelines carry special empirical and democratic legitimacy, or a commitment to the project of inter-judge sentencing uniformity20 Others, by contrast, may have serious institutional doubts about the Commission and the process by which it formulated the Guidelines, and therefore more readily disregard its advice. These explanations undoubtedly interact. Confronted with a case for which the advisory guideline sentence seems a little too high, but not grossly unjust, a judge's assessment of the institutional strengths of the Guidelines and the Commission may tip the scales.
To be sure, inter-judge disparity is but one consideration among many in evaluating the federal sentencing system. It is entirely possible that Booker has, on balance, produced more just sentences by allowing judges greater flexibility and authorizing them to reject unsound guidelines, despite the corresponding increase in inter-judge disparity. And plenty of other federal sentencing priorities deserve attention on the fifth anniversary of Booker, including the elimination of the loo:1 crack-to-powder ratio in drug sentencing, reevaluation of the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentences, and investigation of unwarranted disparity created by prosecutorial charging and bargaining practices."
Nonetheless, reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity was one of Congress's primary goals in the Sentencing Reform Act, and evidence of backsliding ought to be taken seriously. No offender should spend years in jail, and no crime victim should be denied a full measure of justice, solely because of the judge assigned to the case. Based on a first look at guideline sentencing patterns since Booker, the Boston study offers preliminary evidence that concerns about an increase in inter-judge sentencing disparity are well-founded.
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